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1. Introduction 
Following the enactment of the new Energy Act in 1990, which laid the legal foundation for Norway’s 
electricity market reform, Norway was one of the first countries to deregulate and liberalise its 
electricity sector. The main motivation for electricity market reform was an increasing dissatisfaction 
with the performance of the sector in terms of economic efficiency in resource utilisation, particularly 
with regard to investment behavior, which caused capacity to exceed demand considerably (see 
Section 2). Simultaneous market liberalisation initiatives in other pioneering countries, such as New 
Zealand and the UK, increased awareness of the need for electricity reform, and influenced its design 
and implementation. This was particularly the case within the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, which 
initiated the reform. 
 
The market reform should be considered against the background of the structure and functioning of the 
electricity system before liberalisation (Hope et al. 1992) and (Hope 2000, chapter 7). The generation 
of electricity in Norway is almost exclusively based on hydropower. When the reform was launched, 
there were about 70 power-producing companies and 230 network owners in the system. There was 
some vertical integration between power generation and the network, particularly at the regional and 
local levels, but many power producers were not integrated. The largest of them, Statkraft, accounted 
for approximately one-third of total generation. About 85 per cent of the electricity system was 
publicly owned by local, regional and state-owned companies. The power production capacity of the 
energy-dimensioned hydro system in 1991 was approximately 108 TWh in a normal year, of which the 
energy-intensive industries consumed approximately one-third. Annual production could vary 
considerably from year to year because of the stochastic nature of water inflow to the hydro system. 
 
On the consumption side, around 90 per cent of power was sold on long-term contracts, defined as 
contracts for ‘firm power’. Those contracts were negotiated individually and were predominantly 
bilateral, nonstandardised contracts between buyers and sellers. Power producers were obliged to 
deliver power within their concessionary areas and to cover their firm power contract obligations 
through contracts with other power producers. However, the lack of an organised secondhand market 
for contracts made most of the electricity market inflexible. In addition, electricity prices and other 
contract terms were generally set by administrative or political decree. For example, the basic price 
charged by the state-owned company Statkraft, known as the Statkraft price, was an element of the 
annual regulation of the company determined by the Norwegian Parliament. The Statkraft price 
functioned as a price signal to the rest of the market. 
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Because of the stochastic nature of hydropower production, a market for occasional or interruptible 
power developed. In 1972, this market was formally organised as a spot market in a power exchange, 
or pool, among the power producers, known as ‘Samkjøringen’. Spot market transactions were carried 
out at a market-clearing price on an hourly basis determined by bids sent in by the generators to the 
power pool based on expected demand and supply schedules. This wholesale, producer-based spot 
market, comprising approximately the remaining 10 per cent of annual power production, met its 
objectives efficiently. The market is interesting as a forerunner to the design of the organised market 
system produced by Norwegian electricity market reform. In addition, for almost 20 years before 
market reform took place in 1991, it represented a ‘training ground’ for market participants in market-
based transactions. Thus, because of the market experience gained from the spot market for occasional 
power, the learning-by-doing curve for market-based operations was not as steep in Norway as in most 
other countries that implemented power market liberalisation. 
 
The rest of the article is organised as follows: In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the relevant 
background to deregulation. In Section 3, we describe the main elements of market reform. In Section 
4, we discuss market design issues. In Section 5, we describe market development following 
deregulation. In Section 6, we discuss how effectively the new market dealt with extreme supply-side 
shortages in 2002–2003. In Section 7, we discuss market and regulatory challenges. Section 8 
concludes the article. 
2. The background to deregulation 
During the regulation period, all investments in production and transmission capacity were subject to 
cost reimbursement. This was implemented either through direct market prices, cross-subsidisation 
between utilities,1 or direct public subsidies.2 There was no direct link between market prices (since 
there was no functioning market) and investment or between market prices and operating cost 
efficiency. The government, when determining its budget, set the following year’s prices in the 
electricity market.3 The government equated prices to average costs until 1979, from when it set prices 
equal to long-run marginal costs (LRMC). It used LRMC as a price criterion rather than an investment 
                                                     
1 This is made possible by the increasing marginal cost of expansion in firms. 
2 This is achieved through either capital subsidy or relaxed requirements on the rate of return on investment. 
3 In fact, the government set prices for state-owned companies. However, the municipalities and counties, which own almost 
all the rest of the power producing capacities, followed. Since the energy-intensive manufacturing industry had long-term 
contracts, they were exempted. See Bye et al. (1999). 
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criterion.4 The market functioned as a cost reimbursement system and provided no incentives for 
utilities to be cost effective. Moreover, since the transmission network is a natural monopoly, 
regulation is required for welfare maximisation. During the regulation period, while cost minimisation 
(given output) was pursued, output maximisation was also used to ensure an adequate supply. In 
addition, the central government and municipality authorities set different prices for different 
consumers,5 which created inefficiencies and welfare losses in the electricity market. 
 
2.1. Inefficiencies in production 
There was no systematic evaluation of potential inefficiencies in production before deregulation of the 
electricity market, except that imbalances between capacity and demand were evaluated. Statistics 
illustrate excess capacity problems. During the late 1980s, between 5 and 6 per cent of the inflow of 
water to the reservoirs was spilt annually (even in normal inflow years). The prices set by the central 
government restricted demand relative to the capacity of primary energy supply (water inflow). To 
eliminate excess primary energy supply, producers accepted overflow from the reservoirs despite 
sufficient generator capacity. In a free competitive market, generators would produce sufficient water 
because prices would exceed variable cost and would fall to equate supply and demand. Prices would 
eventually be too low to stimulate further investment. 
 
Midttun (1987, pages 102–109) outlines the political discussion of investment and pricing that took 
place in Norway from the 1960s to the 1980s. His main conclusions include the following. (i) 
Production capacity in state-owned companies has not increased following increases in marginal cost. 
(ii) The power price has never been high enough to cover the marginal cost of expansion. (iii) The 
expansion of capacity has led to excessive investments. According to Midttun, the bureaucracy wanted 
to equate prices and long-term marginal costs as an investment rule in the early 1960s. However, 
politicians resisted this until 1979. Then arguments about low electricity prices were replaced by 
debate over the discount rate. Politicians simply proposed a lower discount rate on investment projects 
to secure lower prices. Midttun also documents substantial cost overruns in state-owned companies 
that were because of weak financial management. However, some of the blame must be assigned to 
increasing environmental concerns, political intervention, changes to plans and development delays. 
                                                     
4 In 1979, the government, in a green paper, St. meld nr 54 (1979–1980) decided that the electricity price level in the long run 
should reflect long-run marginal cost. The escalation period continued until 1985. 
5 The purpose was to distribute some of the local natural resource value to local consumers or to support energy-intensive 
industries and the local labor market. 
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Costs overran by 57 per cent on average. Project planning focused on technical issues rather than 
economic issues. 
2.2. Inefficiencies in transmission and distribution 
Transmission networks are regional natural monopolies. Moreover, electricity distribution incurs large 
fixed costs and exhibits decreasing marginal operating costs. This suggests the following 
socioeconomic challenges. (a) The optimal private business price exceeds the optimal socioeconomic 
price. This produces suboptimal demand for transmission services. (b) The private price mark-up may 
cause profitability to exceed the normal rate of return on capital.6 (c) The mark-up may cause technical 
or economic inefficiency in resource utilisation. Although public regulation is important, regulation 
appeared inefficient. 
 
Kittelsen (1993, 1994) and Førsund and Kittelsen (1998) used production frontier analysis to test for 
inefficiencies in network distribution companies. They estimated total annual efficiency losses to be 
between 1.1 and 1.8 billion Norwegian kroner (approximately 300 million USD). This amount 
constitutes 25 per cent of the resources used for distribution per year. They found no evidence that 
mark-ups exceeded those necessary to cover cost inefficiencies. That is, they found no evidence of 
monopoly profits. Hence, distribution networks used their monopoly power to be cost inefficient 
rather than profitable. 
 
There is no documented research on inefficiencies in the central grid. 
2.3. Inefficiencies in the market 
In a perfectly competitive market, one would expect different consumers to pay approximately the 
same price for a homogenous good. Power at the wholesale level at a specific time is close to being a 
homogenous good. Average reported prices for different consumers may be based on different types of 
contract (incorporating factors such as risk, security of supply, time of use, power and energy). 
However, during the regulation period, there was little risk of power shortages because a primary 
objective of the power suppliers was to ensure deliveries at any time.7 
 
                                                     
6 For ease of exposition, we assume the same risk in all alternative projects. However, in practice it is necessary to adjust for 
uncertainty differences. 
7 There was a compulsory delivery standard in each region. 
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Bye and Strøm (1987) did a backward calculation of prices at the power plant (a homogenous good) 
from statistics on purchaser prices (including transmission and taxes) for different consumers. Their 
results are reported in the table 1. Calculated prices for the energy-intensive manufacturing industry 
were between one-third and one-half of the prices for services and households. This indicates 
substantial discrimination, which reduces social welfare. Differences in prices between households 
and services were less substantial. The averages disguise large differences between regions for the 
same consumer group. In the power plant regions, (net exporting) prices were kept low for local 
customers at the expense of those in net importing regions, where prices were high. 
 
Table 1. Power prices—net of taxes and transmission fees. Current prices. øre (kWh) 1 
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Households 12.2 13.7 15.2 17.3 20.0 26.0 
Services 14.2 15.2 16.9 19.2 22.3 28.1 
Other Manufacturing 12.4 13.4 14.5 16.8 19.9 25.4 
Pulp and paper 6.6 7.0 8.2 9.0 10.9 11.0 
Power-intensive industries 4.3 4.5 5.3 5.8 6.2 7.7 
Weighted average 9.5 10.3 11.6 13.4 15.6 19.8 
Source (Bye and Strøm, 1987) 
1. In 2004, 1USD=6.7 NOK; i.e. 20 øre/kWh= 3 cents/kWh 
 
Bye and Strøm (1987), Bye and Johnsen (1991) and (Bye 1991) estimated the implicit annual 
efficiency losses because of this price discrimination at between 3.7 and 4.5 billion Norwegian kroner. 
This represents three times the loss in the distribution network described above. Since the calculations 
assume identical firms within a sector, the calculated efficiency gains are biased downwards. 
3. The main elements of Norwegian market reform 
Based on the Energy Act of 1990, the main elements of the Norwegian electricity market reform were 
as follows. 
• With regard to market design, it was decided to build on the established spot market model for 
trade in interruptible power, while organising it as a regular spot market incorporating 
demand. The market was, in principle,8 open immediately to all potential buyers, including 
                                                     
8 Small consumers had to pay a relatively high access fee when changing contracts in the first four or five years. 
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households. Initially, the market was organised as a separate legal entity within the 
transmission company, Statnett, and was termed the Statnett Market. 
• Common carriage principles requiring access to the network system on a transparent and 
nondiscriminatory basis facilitated market-based trade  
• The dominant, state-owned and vertically integrated company, Statkraft, was split vertically 
into two separate legal entities: the generating company, Statkraft SF, and the transmission 
company, Statnett SF. For the other vertically integrated power companies, companies were 
separated into generating or trading divisions and network divisions for accounting purposes, 
but were not split into companies with separate legal identities. 
• The network companies were subject to natural monopoly regulations designed to achieve 
economic efficiency in network operations. The regulatory regime was administered and 
enforced by the sector-specific regulator, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (NVE), on the basis of rate-of-return regulation. In 1997, income-frame 
regulations were introduced instead. 
• The market liberalisation reform was implemented without changes in ownership, because the 
privatisation of the power sector was politically unacceptable. This contrasted with the UK, 
where privatisation was implemented before market liberalisation. There, privatisation was 
considered a prerequisite for successful electricity market reform from an economic efficiency 
perspective. 
 
The main events that have taken place in the deregulation and market liberalisation process since 1991 
are described below. 
 
As mentioned above, Statnett began trading in the spot market for power (the day-ahead market) in 
1991, when the NVE introduced the regulatory regime for network owners. In 1993, a financial 
forward market was established for the delivery of traded contracts. In 1994, this was replaced by a 
continuous trading system, and standardised financial futures contracts were introduced. 
 
To facilitate trade in the retail market while avoiding investment in expensive metering equipment for 
retail customers, in 1995, load-profile demand measurement was introduced. In 1997, fees for 
consumer switching were also eliminated to stimulate consumer switching and market competition. In 
1998, the Norwegian Competition Authority introduced a price information system for retail prices 
from power suppliers to improve market transparency. The time allowed for consumer switching was 
reduced to a week. 
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In 1996, a common Norwegian-Swedish power market was established to become the first 
intercountry integrated power market in the world. Nord Pool 9 took responsibility for power exchange 
for the common market from Statnett Market.10 The Swedish transmission company, Svenska 
Kraftnät, became coowner with Statnett. In 1998, Finland became an independent price area on the 
Nord Pool power exchange. Denmark integrated into the Nordic system in 2002, since when there has 
been a common Nordic integrated electric power market (excluding only Iceland). 
4. Market design and market operations 
A complete market-based power system should be equipped with markets for the following five basic 
requirements or functions: (a) markets for trade in electricity; (b) markets and instruments for risk 
hedging in accordance with risk preferences; (c) short-term markets for production capacity 11 and 
balancing supply and demand; (d) markets for investment in new capacity; and (e) markets for trade in 
environmental energy products (such as green-certificate markets). Nord Pool has organised markets 
for functions (a), (b), and (e). Function (c) is generally handled by the transmission system operators 
in the individual countries. There are hardly any organised markets for (d). 
 
Nord Pool is a nonmandatory power pool that organises approximately 40 per cent of the total trade in 
electricity in the Nordic power market. The rest is organised on the basis of bilateral contracts. Nord 
Pool’s share in total trade on the organised spot market is a useful indicator of the liquidity of the 
market. This is discussed in relation to the volume of trade in organised financial markets in section 
4.2. 
 
Nord Pool also performs the functions of contract clearing and settlement. Nord Pool established a 
new environmental market for electricity certificates for renewable energy production (green 
certificates) in 2004. 
4.1. Nord Pool’s spot market—Elspot 
Elspot is a contract spot market on which electricity is traded on a daily basis for physical delivery the 
following day (a day-ahead-market), with full obligation to pay. The bidding procedures are 
                                                     
9 See http://www.nordpool.com. 
10 See http://www.Statnett.com. 
11 Capacity markets are needed to provide two kinds of service (see section 4.3). These are: (1) the instantaneous balancing of 
supply and demand to prevent system breakdowns or fallouts; ( 2) accounting for deviations between planned production 
according to the supply and demand schedules at the time when the price is determined and the production is needed to meet 
demand at the time of delivery. 
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essentially the same as those adopted by Statnett Market in 1991. Market participants place bids in the 
Pool one day in advance for the next 24 hours of the following day. The Pool then aggregates the bids 
and prices for each hour based on supply and demand. The Nord Pool system price is the market 
equilibrium price for the aggregated supply and demand schedules for each hour. The spot-market 
system price functions as a reference price for Nord Pool’s financial markets and the bilateral markets 
in the Nordic system. Currently, 280 participants trade daily on the Nord Pool spot market. 
 
The system price is determined without taking into account potential capacity constraints in the 
transmission network system. If calculation of the system price indicates that the power flow between 
two or more areas exceeds capacity limits in the transmission grid, two or more area prices are 
determined. A capacity fee, defined as the difference between the system price and the area price, is 
then calculated. The transmission system operators in the Nordic countries set the capacity fee as an 
integral part of their operation of the system. Thus, the system operators are obliged to use the price 
mechanism in the spot market when adjusting power flows during periods of capacity constraints 
between bidding areas (see Subsection 4.3 below). 
4.2. The markets for derivatives at Nord Pool 
The types of contract traded on Nord Pool’s financial markets comprise electric power derivatives and 
electricity certificates. The financial derivatives are futures, forwards, options, and contracts for 
differences. The contracts have been developed to meet the needs of market participants faced with 
market uncertainty and price volatility, and for risk hedging and risk management. 
 
As already mentioned, the reference price for those contracts is the spot-market system price for the 
total Nordic electric power market. The maximum trading time horizon is currently four years. For all 
financial derivative contracts, the principle of cash settlement applies; that is, there is no physical 
delivery of electricity on those contracts. 
 
The basic distinction between futures and forward contracts is that the former are standardised 
contracts for a given quantity of power at a certain price in a specified time period, while the latter are 
typically nonstandardised. A division of labor between futures and forwards has developed at Nord 
Pool. This is because the time horizon for futures has been reduced from three years to between eight 
and nine weeks, while forward contracts apply to periods of up to four years. Thus, the market seems 
to favor short-term futures near the due date and favors long-term forward contracts near the end of 
the time horizon. This may be because of the difference in margin calls between futures and forwards. 
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Futures are settled daily on a market-to-market basis. This requires a considerable cash commitment 
up-front. By contrast, forwards only require cash collateral during the delivery period. 
 
The option contracts traded at Nord Pool adopt the European convention that contracts can only be 
exercised at the stipulated exercise date. Options combined with futures and forwards offer interesting 
strategies for risk hedging and risk management in electricity power trading. They also allow greater 
flexibility in contract portfolio composition and administration. 
 
Contracts for difference (CFDs) were introduced to allow market participants to hedge against the 
price area risk. As already mentioned, the system operators determine area prices that differ from the 
prevailing system price when there are capacity constraints in the transmission network. Futures and 
forward contracts cannot hedge against this price area risk. Therefore, CFDs were introduced to enable 
perfect hedging even when the market is split into two or more price areas. 
 
In 2004, Nord Pool began the trading of electricity certificates in Sweden, on contracts involving 
physical delivery. Nord Pool plans to introduce forward contracts for such certificates in 2005. A 
Norwegian market for electricity certificates is due to be created in 2007. The anticipated integration 
of the Swedish and the Norwegian markets is expected to increase liquidity and competition in the 
common market. In February 2005, Nord Pool also began trading in carbon emissions by using 
European Union Allowances (EUAs). Hence, it became the first deregulated market in Europe to trade 
in and clear such contracts. 
 
The volume of trade in financial derivatives markets is currently about five times the volume of 
physical trade in the spot market. This ratio is used as an indicator of market liquidity and of how 
efficiently markets are functioning. The ratio is now increasing following a decline in 2003. 
4.3. The balancing markets—capacity markets 
Capacity markets are required to balance supply and demand in an electric power system to avoid 
system breakdowns or delivery fallouts. The following three major types of imbalance between supply 
and demand, which create the need for capacity markets or balancing mechanisms, can be 
distinguished. (a) Deviations can arise between the planned supply and demand schedules on which 
prices are determined in the day-ahead market and the actual demand schedule prevailing at the time 
of delivery within each hourly time section in the spot market. (b) Price deviations can arise because 
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of transmission capacity constraints. (c) There can be imbalances or interruptions because of stochastic 
fallouts of generation or power line capacity. We focus primarily on (b). 
 
If the power flow between two areas exceeds transmission capacity, the price is reduced relative to the 
system price in the surplus (low-price) area and is increased in the deficit (high-price) area. This 
continues until the power flow matches the capacity limits. The system operator responsible for 
capacity regulation on the grid does this when capacity constraints arise. 
 
However, within the Nordic system, different principles and methods are applied to balance capacity. 
In Norway, transmission capacity problems are resolved by the price mechanism in the spot market 
according to the principle of delineation of price areas described above. This is the responsibility of 
the Regulating Power Market, which is operated by the Norwegian system operator, Statnett. Statnett 
divides the country into two or more geographical bidding areas and stipulates the maximum 
transmission capacity between these areas. Every week, based on data from Statnett, Nord Pool then 
informs all market participants of the bidding areas that apply for the following week. Currently, four 
price areas generally apply, but the number depends on grid conditions and the relationship between 
supply and demand in the system. Because of reduced investment in transmission capacity relative to 
demand, capacity constraints have gradually become more binding. This implies that price area 
delineations have become more persistent. 
 
Sweden and Finland form one bidding area in the spot market, while Denmark is divided into two. In 
Sweden and Finland, the counter-purchase principle is applied to manage internal transmission 
bottlenecks. Counter-purchasing involves system operators in Sweden and Finland paying for the 
downward regulation of production in the surplus area and upward regulation in the deficit area until 
the capacity constraint is eliminated. The cost of counter-purchases is financed by tariffs on power 
production. The balancing mechanism used for Sweden and Finland is known as Elbas. 
 
The Regulating Power Market in Norway is organised as a bidding market in which a 15-minute time 
span applies to price determination. For imbalances, which cannot be handled within this period, 
Statnett can impose downward or upward capacity regulation on market participants at short notice 
(less than 15 minutes). Initially, market participants comprised a relatively small number of large 
power producers with considerable regulating capacity. Now, however, the market has been opened to 
participants from the demand side. These include firms in power-intensive industries and other large 
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consumers that are willing and able to regulate their power consumption if the price in the Regulating 
Market gives them an incentive to do so. 
4.4. The retail market 
The organised markets at Nord Pool are wholesale markets for the common, integrated Nordic electric 
power market. The retail markets are largely national markets because of national retail-market 
regulations. However, integrated retail markets are also being developed. 
 
Retail market competition in Norway has been stimulated by regulatory measures to increase market 
transparency and consumer switching. This switching has resulted from the abolition of switching fees 
and the establishment of a price information system for the retail market by the Norwegian 
Competition Authority (NCA) in 1998, as mentioned in Section 2. Note, however, that producers only 
compete on the electric power price. In Norway, this price accounts for roughly one-third of the total 
end-consumer price. The remainder comprises the grid-user price and public taxes and fees, which 
each account for one-third of the total price. Recently, the grid-user price component has increased 
relative to those of power prices and taxes and fees. 
 
The obligation to report retail prices to the NCA applies to around 170 suppliers, of which 50 to 60 
operate regularly in the market. The number of consumers switching suppliers has increased steadily 
since the retail market was opened in 1995. During the first quarter of 2005, around 65,000 household 
consumers changed supplier, which represents 3 per cent of all households. In April 2005, 25 per cent 
of household consumers used a power supplier other than the dominant supplier in the area. However, 
the absolute number of consumers switching suppliers is not necessarily an appropriate indicator of 
increased competition. What matters is whether the number is sufficiently large to cause suppliers to 
set prices competitively. 
 
Approximately three-quarters of Norwegian retail consumers have entered into some form of variable 
retail-price contract (such as a spot-market contract or a standard variable power-price contract). This 
exposes them to variations in the Nord Pool system price on the wholesale spot market. By contrast, in 
Sweden, 80 per cent of retail consumers pay a fixed price. This difference may have arisen because 
Norway depends totally on hydroelectric power, whereas Sweden only depends on hydroelectricity for 
30 to 40 per cent of its total production. Consequently, price volatility has traditionally been higher in 
Norway than in Sweden. In a fully integrated market, however, price volatility should converge. 
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Tradition, contract types, and risk preferences may also explain the difference in contracting 
behaviour. 
 
The retail market has become very transparent, in part because of the price information system of the 
NCA. However, perhaps the market has become too transparent. Perhaps competition has reduced the 
difference between the highest and lowest prices without reducing the average price. Since price 
information is widely available, the retail market may be vulnerable to the exercise of collective 
market power or tacit collusion between suppliers and, therefore, vulnerable to higher prices. 
Information on retail prices is readily available to everybody in the market. The Nord Pool system 
price, which is the reference for retail prices, is also widely known. Moreover, suppliers learn from 
data on past prices and market behavior as they meet each other frequently in the market. This 
hypothesis has not yet been tested empirically by using data on the retail market.12 
4.5. Regulatory policy for electricity markets and networks 
The regulatory policy for the electric power sector comprises a competition policy for electricity 
markets and a regulatory regime for network activities. In both cases, economic efficiency is the 
policy objective. 
 
Norwegian competition policy has mainly been concerned with improving market transparency 
through the retail-price information system and eliminating the abuse of market power by dominant 
firms that have resulted from mergers and acquisitions among electric power companies. The NCA 
investigates mergers and acquisitions. It prevented the acquisition of Agder Energi by Statkraft on 
competition grounds. However, an appeal against the NCA’s decision was made to the Ministry, to 
which the NCA is subordinated. Although the Ministry agreed with the NCA’s analysis of 
competition, it allowed the merger to go through, albeit with modifications. Recently, the NCA has 
been preoccupied with the implications of transmission capacity constraints for competition in 
electricity markets. 
 
A new regulatory regime for network companies was introduced in 1997. It was essentially a revenue-
cap incentive mechanism,13 but it contained elements of rate-of-return, price-cap and yardstick 
regulation. The regulatory period was defined for intervals of five years, but revisions could be 
                                                     
12 For discussion of the relationship between market transparency and the potential exercise of collective and unilateral 
market power, see Hope (2005). Market dominance and market power in electric power markets. A competition policy 
perspective. Report. Stockholm, Swedish Competition Authority. 
13 In Norway, this is referred to as ‘income frame regulation’. 
 16 
undertaken during the period. An annual income frame was set ex ante by the regulator (the NVE) for 
each network company, of which there were 225, mainly distribution companies. The transmission 
company, Statnett, was regulated on the same basis. The revenue cap was based on the total cost 
coverage of network activities, including a stipulated rate of return on invested capital. This rate was 
set at 8.3 per cent for the first year. An efficiency improvement factor was defined for each network 
owner, based on a data envelopment analysis (DEA) of the efficiency improvement potential for each 
company. For the first regulatory year, the efficiency factor was set at 2 per cent of the income frame 
for all network owners. However, it was subsequently modified to depend on the efficiency position of 
each owner in relation to the DEA-efficiency frontier. The highest annual efficiency requirement has 
been a factor of 4.5 per cent. 
 
Although the regulatory regime was supposed to be evaluated and revised in 2001, following the first 
regulatory period, it was extended on more-or-less the same basis for the five-year period from 2002 
to 2007. The NVE has commissioned much research and consultation on the design of the new regime 
to be implemented in 2007. An important and challenging issue facing the new regulatory model is the 
design of an incentive mechanism for optimal investment in the network that enables the market-based 
electricity system to function efficiently. 
5. The development of the market following deregulation 
Deregulation of the electricity market was expected to lower investment, reduce and equalise prices 
between consumers, lower net tariffs, and raise the rate of return on investment. 
5.1. Prices 
In a virtually completely hydro-based electricity market, we would expect increasing long-run 
marginal costs because of a scarcity of resources. Given this background, we would expect higher 
prices in the long run because the investment rule for private investors implies that prices equal long-
run marginal costs. However, in the short or medium run, excess capacity implies that prices equal 
short-term marginal cost plus any shadow price on capacity restrictions. 
 
In the introduction, we indicated that during the regulation period, the public sector invested in excess 
capacity. However, at the same time, it attempted to equate prices to long-run marginal costs. How is 
it possible to have excess capacity when long-run prices reflect long-run marginal costs? There are 
three obvious reasons. (a) Energy-intensive industries, which consume one-third of capacity, paid 
prices corresponding to one-quarter to one-third of long-run marginal costs; that is, instead of 
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increasing capacity further, electricity consumption should be reallocated to equalise prices between 
consumers. Prices would fall below long-term marginal costs and investment would cease. (b) Excess 
production in relation to domestic demand was sold on an international market in the form of 
occasional power at low prices. Instead of increasing capacity further, this production could have been 
allocated to Norwegian consumers by lowering domestic prices. (c) In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
almost 5 per cent of the inflows to reservoirs were spilt 14 during the periods of spring melting and 
autumn rains.15 This water could have produced electricity given that generator capacity was 
sufficient. Prices would have fallen and demand would have increased. Prices would have been too 
low to stimulate further investment; that is, existing capacities would have been sufficient for many 
years. 
 
Since the spillage of water from the reservoirs in the Norwegian hydropower system is regulated by 
competition rules under deregulation, previously excess capacity competes in the market. When excess 
capacity competes in the market, electricity prices are below long-run marginal costs in the short and 
medium run. This persists until demand increases and production capacity constrains growth. Then 
prices increase again and stimulate further investment. Deregulation of the market also puts downward 
pressure on prices by generating an expected efficiency gain in terms of operating costs and 
investment costs in capacity per MWh. Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, there is a major 
increase in market efficiency; that is, greater price equality between consumer groups. 
 
The figure shows changes in the spot price and average prices among consumer groups in 2002. First, 
the spot price is low in comparison to the end-user prices prevailing in 1993. This is mainly because of 
excess capacity and the splitting of the market. Neither the end-user market nor the spot market were 
fully developed after two years of deregulation.16 Second, there is almost no correlation between the 
spot price and end-user prices after four to five years of deregulation, although there was an increasing 
trend in all prices. In this period, end-user prices were similar among consumer groups, which 
suggests that the market eventually functioned as expected. 
 
Since 1997, the Nord Pool market was extended when Sweden and Finland deregulated their 
markets.17 The fee on contract switching for small consumers, which was introduced in 1991, was 
                                                     
14 Source: Statistics Norway: Report 90/1. 
15 Norwegian power capacity is almost completely based on hydroelectric power. 
16 Small consumers had to pay a high access fee when changing contracts in the four or five years following deregulation. 
17 Market expansion increased the amount of surplus power and prices fell. 
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eliminated in this period. End-user prices then followed spot prices on a downward trend. 
Nevertheless, end-user prices remained above the spot price. When the spot price increased in 2000, 
the gap narrowed. 
 
As expected, figure 1 shows that fluctuations in the spot price were negatively correlated with those in 
hydropower production. Since demand elasticities are low (see Bye et al., 2003), a modest change in 
supply may have a large impact on the spot price. 
 
Hence, deregulation did put a downward pressure on the electricity price, seem to have reduced price 
differentials between consumers and have closed the gap between end-user prices and market 
equilibrium prices. 
 
Figure 1. The spot and consumer prices, Nøre/kWh fixed 2002 prices 
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Sources: Statistics Norway and NordPool. 
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Figure 2. The spot price (NOK/kWh left axis) and hydro power production (TWh-right axis) 
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Sources: Statistics Norway and NordPool. 
5.2. Investment in power production capacities 
During the regulation period and in the six years after the deregulation of 1991, production capacity in 
Norwegian hydro power plants exceeded demand; that is, under normal inflow conditions, Norway 
was a net exporter, see figure 3.18 After 1997, production and capacity has been lower than demand, 
except in 2002–2003, when inflows were well below normal. Prices increased dramatically and 
demand responded. 
 
Investments in new production capacity began to fall in the early 1980s, see figure 4, long before 
deregulation. This was mainly because of a sharp increase in the marginal cost of expansion and a 
continuing increase in environmental concerns. These concerns made expansion politically 
unacceptable. After deregulation, investment continued to fall and reached a low level. As demand 
increased, Norwegian capacity was restricted and prices increased.  
 
 
                                                     
18 ‘Normal’ refers to the average over the period 1970–1999. 
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Figure 3. Capacity, production and demand. TWh 
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Source: Statistics Norway and NVE. 
 
 
Figure 4. Investments in power supply and power production. Mill NOK - 2002 prices 
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Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
However, when Sweden, Finland, Denmark and other northern European countries deregulated, excess 
capacity in these countries kept prices low and imports to Norway high. 
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An important issue is whether deregulation provides sufficient incentives for investors to participate in 
expanding the electricity sector in Norway. This issue is high on the public agenda and skepticism is 
widespread. However, conclusions are often confused with the potential effect of persistent regulation 
of energy resources because of environmental concerns. Politicians seem unanimous in blocking new 
investment in large hydropower plants, gas-fired power plants and nuclear and other thermal plant 
technologies. Hence, there are restrictions on the supply side. Consequently, prices increase. The only 
feasible alternatives seem to be renewable technologies based on, for example, wind, biomass, solar 
energy and wave power. Since these technologies are costly, their market prices are not sufficiently 
high to stimulate investment in the absence of strong financial support. 
5.3. Rate of return on power production 
Excess capacity relative to demand implies low capacity utilisation (before 1991) or low prices (after 
1991) and a low rate of return on investment. A low rate of return hinders investment in new capacity. 
Unlike in the manufacturing industry, the rate of return in the power sector in Norway has been low 
since deregulation.19 However, the rate of return has recovered since 2000 because hardly any 
investment in new capacity has taken place while demand has increased by, on average, between 1 and 
1.5 % per year for the last 10 to 15 years. In a hydropower-based electricity production system, one 
can expect the average rate of return to be higher than in other industries (such as manufacturing). 
 
Figure 5. Rate of return in manufacturing and power production. Percent 
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Source: Statistics Norway 
                                                     
19 In much of the manufacturing industry in Norway, the rate of return varies because of international business cycles (in, for 
example, aluminum, ferro alloys, chemicals, and pulp and paper). This explains the low rate of return in manufacturing in 1991. 
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This is because the basic resource is scarce and marginal costs are increasing.20 Scarcity is not yet a 
problem, but will become one as the market develops. 
5.4. Investment in networks 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, much of the power production capacity in Norway was expanded 
through ‘combined’ projects. Power projects were implemented and energy-intensive manufacturing 
were developed at the same location. Manufacturing industry was located near power plants to 
minimise transmission costs and benefit from the cheap energy based on the resources from large 
waterfalls. These developments were on the western coast of the country. Over time, demand grew 
because of growth in demand from services and the residential sector, mainly in the densely populated 
areas in the east of the country.21  
 
Figure 6. Investment in network capacity. Mill NOK - 2002 prices 
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Source: Statistics Norway 
 
 
The location of hydropower in thewest increased the need for transmission capacity from west to east 
and, to a certain extent, from north to south. As higher fuel oil prices in the 1970s (introduced by 
                                                     
20 New investment will not occur unless prices cover the long-run increases based on marginal cost. This applies unless there 
is backstop technology that limits increases in marginal costs or unless there is unlimited import capacity at fixed prices. 
21 Demand from the residential sector was five times higher in 2004 than in 1960, while demand from manufacturing 
industries was only about twice as high. The residential sector used almost the same amount of electricity as did the 
manufacturing industry in 2004. 
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OPEC in 1973–1974 and again in 1978–1979) and increasing environmental concerns triggered a 
sharp increase in sulfur taxes and regulation of the sulfur content in oil products, massive substitution 
of fuel oil with electricity took place in the heating sector. Along with aggregate economic growth, 
this raised demand for capacity investment in the distribution network. Once this large infrastructure 
project had been completed, investment in network infrastructure capacity decreased. 
 
These developments could explain the sharp decrease in network investment that occurred between 
1988 and 1993, which is illustrated by the figure. However, this is just part of the story. The decrease 
in investment also coincided with the debate that took place before and during deregulation of the 
Norwegian electricity market in 1991. While power production and trade were exposed to 
competition, a new regulatory regime was introduced for transmission and distribution network 
companies in 1991. Rate-of-return regulation and ‘yardstick competition’ reduced network tariffs. The 
network reimbursement policy was replaced by yardstick competition to secure cost efficiency and an 
improved social investment strategy in capacity. When the profitability of network investment fell, 
investment also declined. Investment in networks increased again in 2002–2003 because of the 
upgrading of existing networks and the installation of new capacity designed to alleviate temporary 
network constraints. 
5.5. From rate-of-return regulation to income regulation 
With the introduction of the new Energy Act, rate-of-return regulation was introduced for network 
companies. In 1997, this regulation was replaced by income regulation. An important aspect of income 
regulation is the efficiency rate (see Appendix A), which is specific to the distribution network and, 
ceteris paribus, reduces annual allowable network-specific income. Given capacity and utilisation, the 
net tariff is reduced by this efficiency rate, which is based on both yardstick competition and a 
catching-up-period rule.22 On average, the network tariff in Norway is expected to fall by about 20 per 
cent between 1997 and 2005. 
 
Figures 7-8 show changes in total income and the network tariff in this period. Income was on an 
upward trend before 2003, when it fell. Over the whole period, real income fell by 1.5 per cent, which 
is less than the fall in the efficiency rate. This was mainly because of an increase in transmission 
capacity, as income per transmitted kWh fell by about 18 per cent in this period. Operating costs drove 
tariffs up, while the fall in interest rates reduced them. 
                                                     
22 The catching-up period in this rule is the period that firms are allowed for catching up with the leading firm. 
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Figure 7. Regulated total income in networks. Current and fixed (2004) prices. Billion NOK 
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Source: Statistics Norway and NVE. 
 
Figure 8. Net-tariffs. 2004-prices. Nøre/kwh 
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Source: Statistics Norway and NVE. 
 
Because regulation is more sophisticated and because supply and demand are stochastic, transmission 
tariffs and regulated income per transmitted unit may behave differently in the short run. However, in 
the longer run, transmission and distribution networks must pay back excess income and may add 
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accumulated, but insufficient, income to future regulated income. The regulatory regime allows this 
adjustment to take time (several years). According to the regulatory authority, this fully explains the 
increase in tariffs over the last three or four years. As tariffs had previously been low, tariffs had to 
increase to make up the income shortfall. Since precipitation and inflow were low in 2002 and 2003, 
and the resulting high prices in the market reduced demand substantially, income regulation resulted in 
higher tariffs per transmitted and distributed kWh. According to the regulatory authority, ceteris 
paribus, tariffs are expected to fall over the next two years. 
 
In the longer run, interest rates, operating costs and the spot-market price (the price of transmission 
losses) are expected to increase. This may offset the downward bias that is due to the yardstick 
efficiency gain measure. 
 
Another important issue is whether the new regulatory regime provides sufficient incentives to invest 
in infrastructure capacity in this sector. This is a widely debated issue in Norway and represents a 
further challenge. 
5.6. Market structure and concentration 
The dominant producer of hydropower in Norway, Statkraft, is a state-owned company. Before 
deregulation of the electricity industry, Statkraft produced around 30 per cent of Norway’s power. 
However, much of its output was delivered to the energy-intensive manufacturing industry on the 
basis of long-term contracts. Statkraft’s share of the remainder of the market was less than 15 per cent. 
Private firms provided about 10 per cent of Norway’s production capacity, while municipalities and 
counties owned the rest. 
 
Following deregulation, many of the companies under local-government ownership were turned into 
limited-liability firms. Larger regional power companies were established, partly through acquisitions 
and mergers among local-government entities. The state-owned company, Statkraft, also grew through 
mergers, acquisition and the purchase of shares in other large and small power companies, partly 
encouraged by politicians, although there was some obstruction from the competition authority. 
Politicians focused on Norway as part of a larger Nordic integrated electricity market in which 
Statkraft was a minor player. That is, competition prevailed, and the authorities wanted to develop 
Statkraft as an important player in the international market. The competition authority accentuated 
changes in regional markets, that is, when transmission was constrained and the market leader could 
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exercise market power. Eventually, Statkraft was allowed to purchase companies, but was also forced 
to sell divisions to increase competition. 
 
Bye et al. (2003) report a Hirschman–Herfindahl concentration index for the Norwegian market based 
on direct ownership of 0.1634. One that incorporates inactive but incentive-based cross-ownership is 
0.1980. A third index that controls for demand 23 and incentive-based cross-ownership is 0.3325. They 
concluded from the traditional measure (0.1634) that the Norwegian market remains concentrated. 
However, if we take into account cross-ownership, the market is reasonably concentrated (0.3325). 
For the whole Nordic region, they found a cross-ownership, incentive-based index of 0.1138, which 
suggests an unconcentrated market. 
 
The relevant issue is whether the Nordic market is an integrated market or a regionalised market. 
Hourly data on area prices indicate the scale of transmission constraints and allow a calculation of the 
scope of the relevant market. In 2001, the Nordic market was fully integrated 51.8 per cent of the time 
and regionalised otherwise, based on calculations for seven Nordic regions. The most populated area 
in Norway, the south, was classified as a separate area less than 10 per cent of the time, while the 
northern part of the country was a separate area nearly 20 per cent of the time. Thus, the issue of 
market power is relevant. 
 
Generally, it is difficult to prove the abuse of market power, especially in a hydropower system in 
which the primary energy source, and implicitly total production from a reservoir, is determined by 
inflows (given that the regulators monitor any waste of water). However, concentration is not all that 
matters; any plant on the margin in a restricted price area, even a small firm, may abuse market power. 
Clearly, mergers or acquisitions that increase concentration should be prevented. Alternatively, 
transmission capacity between regions could be increased. 
6. A market under stress—a real test 
The Nordic electricity market was exposed to an extreme primary energy shock between 2002 and 
2003. A short-term shortage of precipitation and inflow sharply increased prices and led to vigorous 
discussion of the functioning of the deregulated market when exposed to such extreme situations. 
Policies that could to relieve these so-called ‘infirmities’ in the market were discussed. However, Bye 
(2003) showed that the market functioned remarkably well; producers tried to optimise the value of 
                                                     
23 That is, the index controls for demand according to ownership share. 
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water, as expected; electricity trade followed anticipated patterns; and consumers responded as 
predicted by theory. (See Bye et al., 2003, and Fehr et al., 2004). 
 
During the period of regulation of the Norwegian electricity market, a security-of-supply rule was 
introduced for investment decisions. According to this rule, there should be enough capacity at any 
time to satisfy demand. The primary supply (precipitation and inflow) is stochastic in a power system 
dominated by hydropower. Demand changes because almost 90 per cent of heating is electric and 
outdoor temperatures vary substantially. The any-event security-of-supply rule thus implied excess 
capacity in normal situations and water spillage in above-normal inflow conditions. When 
deregulation was introduced, prices and investment fell. Firm-specific profit maximisation reduced 
excess capacity over time. Stochastic supply and demand eventually increase price fluctuations. If the 
rains fail, as they did in the autumn of 2002, prices are expected to increase. 
 
The fundamental profit-maximisation problem for a hydropower producer is to optimise the value of 
stochastic inflows of water over time (Førsund, 1994). The reservoir is an instrument for equalising 
prices over time. Under simplifying assumptions, it leads to the maximisation of profit from the 
production of power. If enough producers compete efficiently, if no transmission constraints occur, if 
there is sufficient storage capacity, and if precipitation, inflow and weather are normal, then equalising 
prices between periods also optimises the social surplus. If there are no constraints, this optimising 
strategy generates equal prices for electricity over time and place. In practice, these assumptions are 
simplistic, but sufficient for the reasoning that follows, except for the inflow uncertainty. For further 
discussion of a more complex system, see Førsund (1994) and Bye (2003). 
 
In the Norwegian hydropower system, water typically flows into the reservoir during the snow-melting 
period from early May to mid July and in the rainy season from mid September to late October. The 
high-demand period is winter, from October to April, while demand is low in summer, from May to 
August. In a hydropower system, profit-maximising behavior involves equalising the value of water 
(the price of power) between periods. To do so, the storage capacity of the reservoirs is used. 
 
In the spring of 2002, since the inflow to the hydro reservoirs exceeded the normal level, production 
increased and prices decreased. The water level was above normal. Producers had the incentive to 
produce to avoid an overflow in the rainy autumn season. However, the autumn rains did not come, 
which resulted in a 20 TWh (17 per cent of Norway’s annual production) inflow shortfall within 6 
weeks, relative to the normal inflow for this period. The probability of this happening was 
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approximately 0,5 per cent. Prices in the spot market increased to an all-time high level (and 
quadrupled on average within two months). Over a period of 12 months, average spot prices increased 
by almost 50 per cent. Demand fell by about 5 per cent, despite many manufacturing companies 
having fixed-price contracts. Some companies even sold power back to the electricity companies 
under these fixed contracts.24 
 
During this period, physical rationing of power was discussed because of a possible draining of the 
reservoirs during winter. Some focused on a possible malfunction of the market (because of abuses of 
market power, irrational behavior by new firms, and the inadequacy of the market for dealing with 
extreme events). Politicians threatened to reregulate the market and proposed several measures for 
dealing with extreme situations. They were primarily motivated by public and media focus on the 
possibility of rationing and severe price effects on the income distribution. 
 
At the request of the Minister of Administrative Affairs, Bye et al. (2003) evaluated the event and 
concluded that the market functioned as expected and that the market dealt with the extreme almost 
perfectly. The historic rate of return in power production explains low investment in production 
capacity and is not a consequence of malfunctioning or the abuse of market power. Moreover, between 
2002 and 2003, expectations of futures prices (contract prices for hedging two or three years ahead) 
were low despite the high prices specified in physical contracts. Thus, short-term prices did not justify 
an expansion of productive capacity. High prices simply reflected a water shortage and the need to 
stabilise water values over time, which reflected great uncertainty. The water balance in the summer of 
2002 was well above normal. This put downward pressure on prices to increase demand and generate 
a water balance that was low enough to accommodate the autumn rains. Because the rain failed and 
the water balance fell, the market had to adjust to restore the water balance in the spring of 2003. 
Since imports were restricted, domestic prices had to rise. 
 
Although the market seems to have functioned well, Bye et al. (2003) identify issues for further study 
and follow-up by the competition authorities. One issue is the future design of contracts. The market 
seems to have been competitive despite the fact that transmission was restricted between Norway and 
other countries almost 60 per cent of the time during the winter of 2002–2003. However, there seems 
to have been a problem because of price differences in the contract market, both in the wholesale 
market (see a forthcoming study by Bye et al., 2005) and in the retail market (see Fehr et al., 2005). 
                                                     
24 These contracts represented a combination of price and volume contracts. 
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7. Some challenges 
In a comprehensive EU-financed research project on European electricity reforms, known as SESSA,25 
the Nordic electric power market model was suggested as a potential benchmark for market 
organisation and the efficient functioning of electric power markets.26 However, even if the Norwegian 
and Nordic electric power markets and their regulatory systems performed reasonably well in terms of 
competition and economic efficiency, there is scope for improvement. Some issues and challenges in 
this context are as follows. 
 
1. Market dominance and market power. Investigations by competition authorities and research 
studies have not documented instances of the exercise of market power in the Nordic power 
market, either unilaterally or collectively.27 However, market power is a recurring issue in the 
debate on the Nordic market. This is partly because of the characteristics of electricity as a 
commodity in market terms and partly because of the increase in market concentration 
following restructuring of the market through mergers and acquisitions between electric power 
firms. The issue of market power suggests the need for the design of a system for monitoring 
the market and its regulatory system, as argued by Hope (2005). 
2. Design and operation of investment markets. The Nordic market has performed reasonably 
well in terms of the efficient operation of a market system with a fixed capacity, because the 
excess capacity that had built up before the market was reformed has meant that further 
investment is not required for capacity expansion. Thus, investment is optimal and capacity is 
adequate. There is no overall investment planning system for the Nordic electric power system 
and there is a lack of investment markets for optimal investment within the integrated Nordic 
market. 
3. Network integration and system operation. The Nordic transmission network system remains 
decentralised in the sense that national transmission companies are responsible for the 
operation of, and investment in, the national network, and for system operation. Cooperation 
between transmission companies takes place on a voluntary basis through NORDEL. The 
regulation of network companies and the handling of network constraints are not harmonised 
on a Nordic-wide basis, which results in potential inefficiencies in the functioning of the 
power markets. A common, independent transmission system operator for the integrated 
Nordic market is also lacking. 
                                                     
25 For documentation, see the SESSA webpage, www.sessa.eu.com. 
26 See Hope and Singh (2005). 
27 See the Nordic Competition Authorities (2003) and Hope (2005). 
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4. Integration of the Nordic market with the European electricity market at large. Economic 
efficiency could be increased if the Nordic market were more closely integrated with the 
European electricity market. Although insufficient transmission capacity limits such 
integration, transmission investment is planned. For example, an undersea cable between 
Norway and the Netherlands is being developed. The more mature Nordic market in terms of 
market organisation, competition and regulation, may promote power market liberalisation in 
Europe. 
8. Summary 
During the regulation period, investment in production and transmission capacity in the electricity 
market was subject to cost reimbursement, through either direct prices in the market, cross-
subsidisation between utilities or direct public subsidies. There was no direct link between market 
prices and investment or between market prices and operating cost efficiency. Several studies report 
substantial inefficiencies in the production, transmission, distribution and market distribution of 
electricity. 
 
The new deregulated market was intended to build on the principles applied in an already existing spot 
market for interruptible power. Vertically integrated power companies were split into divisions on an 
accounting basis. A derivate market was opened to deal with hedging against uncertainty. Introducing 
common carriage and securing access to the grid on a transparent and nondiscriminatory basis opened 
up the electricity network. The network companies were subject to regulation, the objective of which 
was to increase economic efficiency. 
 
Following deregulation, electricity prices fell, prices between consumer groups became more equal, 
investment declined in both production and transmission capacity and, over time, the return on capital 
increased. In addition, market concentration increased and opportunities to exercise market power 
arose as the market became more regionalised because of transmission constraints. Market power does 
not seem to have been abused. The stochastic electricity market is occasionally tested by extreme 
events, particularly on the supply side. However, the market seems to have handled these events well. 
 
Some challenges remain with respect to market concentration, the design and operation of investment 
markets, network integration and system operation, and integration of the Nordic and European 
electricity markets. 
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Appendix A 
The network income regulation formula 
The income regulation formula (R) includes a four-year average of operating costs, D, a 
capital cost element, tKrr *)( ++δ , which includes depreciation, δ , and the rate of return, r , 
a consumer price index adjustment, 1996/ citci PP , the cost of transmission losses, tt pX )(τ , at 
market prices, pt , an efficiency requirement, ( )∏
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1 κ , and some additional adjustment for 
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